Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī’s (d. 321/933) theory of ‘states’ (aḥwāl) and its adaption by Ashʿarite theologians by Thiele, Jan
Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī’s (d. 321/933) Theory




This chapter discusses the notion of ‘states’ (aḥwāl) in Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite
theology. The concept was borrowed from linguistics by the Muʿtazilite theolo-
gian Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933). It helped him to explain the nature
of God’s attributes without asserting the existence of co-eternal beings in God.
The conception of attributes as ‘states’ became a central doctrine among Abū
Hāshim’s followers, the so-called Bahshamiyya school. The theory of aḥwāl was
ﬁrst rejected by Ashʿarite theologians. With Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013),
however, an important representative of the school eventually came to use the
term within the framework of his theory of attributes. Later, Abū l-Maʿālī al-
Juwaynī (d. 478/1085–6) also followed al-Bāqillānī in adopting the notion of ḥāl.
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The notion of ‘states’ (aḥwāl, sing. ḥāl) was introduced into Muʿtazilite theology
by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī. By adopting this concept, he intended to solve a fun-
damental problem that had challenged theologians for several generations. The
principal question whichMuslim theologians posed was: How can we conceive of
God as one and, at the same time, describe Him by a multitude of qualities? With
the concept of ḥāl, Abū Hāshim provided a category alongside the nature of mere
things or entities (ashyāʾ, sing. shayʾ ). Because only things were believed to be ei-
ther existent or non-existent, Abū Hāshim’s deﬁnition of God’s multiple qualities
as ‘states’ helped him to avoid asserting the existence of other beings within God.
*This chapter was prepared within the framework of a M4HUMAN fellowship awarded by the
Gerda Henkel Foundation.
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None of Abū Hāshim’s own writings are any longer extant and we therefore do
not have access to his original formulation of this theory. Consequently, his teach-
ings can only be reconstructed on the basis of later sources. In his study of Abū
Hāshim’s theory of attributes, Richard Frank was the ﬁrst modern scholar to rely
extensively on the writings of the later adherents of Abū Hāshim’s school, which
was named after him as Bahshamiyya. Frank’s interpretation was later fundamen-
tally questioned by Ahmed Alami. On the basis of recently explored Bahshamī
primary sources, Alami’s critique is, however, no longer tenable. These sources
actually conﬁrm Frank’s results and, furthermore, allow scholars to reﬁne his un-
derstanding of the theory. The concept of ‘states’ was ﬁrst rejected by Ashʿarite
theologians. With Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), however, an important
representative of the school eventually came to use the term within the frame-
work of his theory of attributes. Later, Abū l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085–6)
also followed al-Bāqillānī in adopting the notion of ḥāl.
I. The Problem of Divine Attributes
Discussions on the characteristics of beings, and in particular God’s attributes,
have always been of central concern to Muslim theologians. Essentially, these dis-
cussions arose from two principal assumptions about the nature of God that are,
from a logical standpoint, difﬁcult to reconcile. Appealing to divine revelation,
theologians argued for a strict understanding of monotheism and negated any
multiplicity in God. However, the Qurʾān does not only stress that God is one.
It equally characterizes God by a plurality of properties, reﬂected in His ‘most
beautiful names’ (al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā). It was, therefore, necessary for theologians to
explain the precise sense in which predications such as ‘God knows’ reﬂect His
reality. They could then ask to what such predications like God’s knowing re-
fer. The answer to this problem was exceptionally difﬁcult. On the one hand,
to afﬁrm that God possesses eternal knowledge could be interpreted as positing
the reality of something distinct from God that, like Him, is also eternal. In the
opinion of some theologians, such an afﬁrmation would fundamentally violate
the notion of monotheism. On the other hand, however, there were theologians
who pointed out that to afﬁrm that God is knowledge undermines divine tran-
scendence. If neither of these two solutions were satisfactory, how then could the
Qurʾānic description of a knowing God be true?
According to reports by later authors, the earliest speculation on God’s at-
tributes emerged towards the end of the second/eighth century. It appears that
earlier Muslim theologians who applied rational argumentation were initially
more concerned with issues other than those centred on resolving the problem of
God’s attributes. TheMuʿtazilite Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (d. c. 200/815) is said to have for-
mulated a negative theology when interpreting the epithets of God found in the
Qurʾān. According to his position, the statement ‘God is knowing’ merely means
that He is not ignorant. Like any other form of negative theology, this approach
attempted to do justice to God’s nature on the linguistic level, since His reality
was actually believed to be beyond what can be expressed through language. In
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the speciﬁc case of Ḍirār b. ʿAmr, the theory’s aim was to preserve God’s ab-
solute transcendence by avoiding the postulation of any multiplicity within God
that undermines His oneness. This negative theology was, however, unsatisfac-
tory because it was not entirely consistent with the Qurʾānic text, which usually
expresses God’s characteristics by way of afﬁrmation rather than negation (van
Ess 1991: iii. 37–8).
The ﬁrst theologian to analyse systematically what the Qurʾān means when it
predicates something of God was the Muʿtazilite Abū l-Hudhayl (d. 227/841–2).
He was not convinced by his older contemporary’s negative theology and there-
fore maintained that such properties as ‘knowing’ do refer to a reality, namely the
act of knowing. It is possible that Abū l-Hudhayl believed his position was sup-
ported by Qurʾānic references to actual attributes, for example ‘Say: The knowl-
edge is with God’ (qul: innamā l-ʿilm ʿinda Llāh, Q 67: 26) or ‘My Lord embraces
all things in His knowledge’ (innamā ʿilmuhā ʿinda rabbī, Q 6: 80). Abū l-Hudhayl
therefore argued that it was valid to infer from statements like ‘God is knowing’
the presence of knowledge (ʿilm) by which God is knowing. Nevertheless, in in-
terpreting such references he was always conscious that he had to avoid positing
the reality of distinct knowledge or power in God at all costs, since this would
violate the idea of God’s absolute oneness. Abū l-Hudhayl therefore afﬁrmed the
identity between God and His knowledge, His power, and so forth (van Ess 1991:
iii. 272–6, iv. 441–2).
Abū l-Hudhayl’s exegetical approach was a turning point in the theological
discussion on divine attributes and marked the end of the negative theology of
earlier thinkers. His conclusions were, however, received with scepticism; he had
not resolved the fundamental problem, which arose in relation to the principle of
monotheism when a plurality of attributes in God was afﬁrmed. In addition, Abū
l-Hudhayl’s theory raised new questions. His formulation suggested that assert-
ing that God knows, creates etc. still refers to one and the same reality, namely,
God Himself. Assuming this is the case, why then should the act of knowing
be distinguished from the act of creating if, according to Abū l-Hudhayl, each of
these acts is identical with God? Consequently, should we not conclude that God
in Himself is an act of knowledge and of creating and that, therefore, knowing
and creating have exactly the same meaning when applied to God?
It was speciﬁcally in reaction to such problems raised by Abū l-Hudhayl’s
theory that his younger contemporary, al-Naẓẓām (d. between 220/835 and
230/845), completely rejected the idea that God is knowing by an act of knowl-
edge or creating by an act of creation. To solve the problem of attributes, he
sought categorically to avoid positing entitative knowledge or power when speak-
ing about the ontological ground of God’s attributes. Al-Naẓẓām’s solution was
to argue that God’s knowing, creating, etc. refer to God Himself (ithbāt dhātihi),
rather than to an act of knowledge or creation, since He is knowing and creat-
ing by virtue of Himself (ʿālim/qādir bi-nafsihi) (van Ess 1991: iii. 399f.). With
al-Naẓẓām’s overturning of Abū l-Hudhayl’s thesis, a major step was taken in the
discussion of the problem of attributes. The later Baṣran tradition of the Muʿ-
tazila adopted the same formulation, which they took as their point of departure
for further reﬂection on this topic. Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/915), the ﬁrst of
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‘the two masters’ of Baṣran Muʿtazilism, used al-Naẓẓām’s label ‘li-nafsihi’ when-
ever referring to attributes that describe objects as what they are in themselves.
With his adaption of the notion, Abū ʿAlī went beyond al-Naẓẓām’s original idea,
since he discussed the issue of God’s attributes within the broader context of the
nature of both created and uncreated being. He maintained that if the afﬁrma-
tion ‘God is eternal’ (Allāh qadīm) refers to the reality of the described object, the
same applies when we say that ‘black is black’ (al-sawād sawād): both predications
express that by which an object is called by virtue of itself (li-nafsihi). This speciﬁc
type of predication constitutes only one among several categories of attributes,
including attributes that are not grounded in the described object itself but, for
example, in another entity (li-ʿilla) that is distinct from the qualiﬁed object (Frank
1982a: 261f.).
II. The Origin and Signiﬁcance of Abū Hāshim’s
Concept of ‘States’
Following al-Naẓẓām’s reasoning, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī argued against Abū
l-Hudhayl that a description of God as being knowing cannot possibly refer
to entitative knowledge. Abū ʿAlī agreed with al-Naẓẓām’s critique of Abū
l-Hudhayl’s thesis that divine knowledge was identical with God. For both
theologians, Abū l-Hudhayl’s thesis did not satisfactorily resolve the problem
of attributes. They consequently argued that the predication ‘God is knowing’
refers to nothing but God himself.
The logical corollary of this theory is that predications such as ‘he is knowing’
reﬂect different ontological realities when afﬁrmed of God and human beings.
The meaning of ‘being knowing’ was, according to Abū ʿAlī, the same whether
applied to God or man—it simply negates ignorance in the subject of predication.
However, that which ‘being knowing’ refers to is not identical when applied to
God and created bodies: unlike God, a body’s ‘being knowing’ always refers to
something distinct from the knower, namely an entity of knowledge that is the
ground of its being so. However, for Abū ʿAlī the descriptive term (or attribute:
ṣifa) itself has no extralinguistic reality in either case. He simply regarded the ṣifa
as identical with the act of description or attribution (waṣf ). Consequently, it was
impossible in the context of Abū ʿAlī’s theory to explain or even talk about the
qualities of beings without referring to their speciﬁc grounds. Abū ʿAlī’s theory
thus failed to provide a framework within which to conceive of attributes as such
(Frank 1978: 15–19; Frank 1982a: 259).
Within the Baṣran Muʿtazilite tradition, Abū ʿAlī’s son Abū Hāshim was the
ﬁrst to provide a theoretical foundation for the ontological nature of attributes,
one which was consistent with his understanding of beings, and of God in partic-
ular. He built on his father’s theory by introducing a new category into the con-
ception of the reality of beings and thereby avoided the limitations set by an ontol-
ogy that only conceived of either existent or non-existent categories. According
to the Baṣran tradition, the world consists of things or entities (pl. ashyāʾ/dhawāt,
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sing. shayʾ/dhāt). These things can be the subject in a predicative sentence and
can be described by speciﬁc qualities, which a fortiori implies that they become ob-
jects of knowledge. ‘Things’ are subdivided into God, whose existence is eternal
and necessary, and created things, whose existence is only temporal and possible.
The Baṣran Muʿtazilites believed the created world to be composed of atoms (pl.
jawāhir, sing. jawhar), i.e. indivisible particles of which bodies are made up, and ac-
cidents (pl. aʿrāḍ, sing. ʿaraḍ), which are considered as the grounds of the changing
qualities of atoms and bodies, including their annihilation, and also of location,
motion, colours etc. (Dhanani 1993: 15–20, 29–33; Thiele 2013: 59–74). Fol-
lowing intense internal debate within the early Muʿtazilite tradition, the Baṣran
school ultimately settled on a controversial position regarding the non-existence
of created beings. They claimed that the non-existent is also a shayʾ/dhāt, that is,
that existence is not required for things to become objects of knowledge and of
predication (Frank 1980). According to the Baṣrans, if the non-existent is not a
‘thing’ then this also entails that it cannot be an object of knowledge. This po-
sition would consequently lead to the inescapable but unacceptable conclusion
that God could not be eternally omniscient—since omniscience necessarily im-
plies that God knows His creatures before He creates them. The upshot of this
line of reasoning is that without antecedent knowledge of His creatures, God
would be unable to create them. Some Baṣran theologians put forward the an-
cillary argument that if the non-existent cannot be known, man himself would
then be unaware of any action he performed in the past, since after having been
performed such actions of course no longer existed.
Abū Hāshim added to the three aforementioned subcategories of ‘things’
(God, atoms, and accidents) a new ontological category that is neither existent
nor non-existent. To conceive of and express this new category he adopted
the concept of ‘states’ (aḥwāl, sing. ḥāl) developed in the ﬁeld of grammar and
transferred it to the ontology of attributes. In Arabic grammar, ḥāl denotes the
function of indeﬁnite accusative nouns that describe the circumstances of the
subject or the object in a verbal sentence. This so-called ‘accusative of state’ is
also required for predicates of the verb kāna/yakūnu (‘to be’). It seems that Abū
Hāshim’s analysis of the verb kāna was adopted from the grammarians of Baṣra.
They distinguished between the use of kāna, yakūnu as a ‘complete verb’ (ﬁʿl tāmm)
in the meaning of ‘to exist’ on the one hand, and an ‘incomplete’ (nāqiṣa) verb
on the other hand. Whereas the ‘complete’ kāna together with its subject forms
a self-contained sentence, the ‘incomplete’ kāna is transitive and requires an
accusative object. However, some syntactical constructions with kāna followed
by an accusative noun only appear to be transitive on the surface. In fact, the
presumed complement has to be interpreted as a ḥāl by which the subject of the
‘complete’, intransitive kāna is characterized. In such cases, the predicate must
not be understood as an equivalent to the subject, but rather expresses a manner
of being or circumstance of the subject. Abū Hāshim applied this grammatical
analysis to predications about things and interpreted the properties attributed
to a subject as a ‘state’ (ḥāl). By adopting this line of reasoning, Abū Hāshim
and his followers consistently avoided speaking of ‘knowledge’ (ʿilm), ‘will’ (irāda),
etc. whenever referring to the attributes of things as such. The characteristics
5
of beings were instead expressed by way of an accusative of state, for example
by such formulations as kawnuhu ʿāliman (‘his being knowing’), kawnuhu murīdan
(‘his being willing’), etc. (Frank 1978: 20–2; Frank 1982b: 344f.). When the
Bahshamīs used the nouns ‘knowledge’ (ʿilm) or ‘will’ (irāda), they exclusively
denoted accidents, that is distinctly existing grounds of a body’s ‘being knowing’
or ‘being willing’.
With his conception of attributes as ‘states’, Abū Hāshim assigned an onto-
logical reality to the attributes and thereby diverged signiﬁcantly from his father’s
position. According to Abū ʿAlī, only the grounds of the properties of beings
have any reality in the qualiﬁed subject, whereas attributes (ṣifāt) merely denote
the act of describing a subject. In principle, the Bahshamīs also applied the no-
tion of ṣifa to the act of describing itself. The extant literature reﬂects, however, a
more ﬂexible use of the term ṣifa, with theologians tending to use it as a synonym
of ḥāl. Consequently, afﬁrming the same ontological reality for the ṣifa that was
posited for the ḥāl became widely accepted. In their terminology, the Bahshamīs
described the reality of the ḥāl (or ṣifa) by the term thubūt (or thabata/yathbutu) as
opposed to the existence (wujūd) of things or entities.
As previously outlined, only entities can be known when considered in isola-
tion. In contrast, attributes (whether referred to as ḥāl or ṣifa) cannot be objects
of knowledge. They are rather ‘intelligible’ (maʿqūl or ʿuqila), so that a thing is
known as being in the state by which it is qualiﬁed. Stating that someone is living
(kawnuhu ḥayyan) consequently means that I know the subject referred to as being
living. It does not, however, entail that that subject is life, while similarly, if it
is afﬁrmed as living, this of itself does not account for why the subject is living.
The conceptual distinction between the reality of the ḥāl and that of its ontolog-
ical ground allowed for a univocal understanding of two subjects’ being living,
irrespective of whether or not they are alive for the same reason. This Bahshamī
conception was made possible because knowledge of the ontological ground of a
property was no longer regarded as a prerequisite for understanding the speciﬁc
property of a subject (Frank 1978: 22–4).
III. The Typologies of Attributes in Bahshamī
Theology
In assigning to attributes a reality by way of a ḥāl—i.e. a reality that is conceived
independently of the ḥāl’s ontological root—the identiﬁcation of an attribute’s spe-
ciﬁc ground was thereby deferred and left to a higher level of theological analysis.
The reasoning behind this is that we become aware of an object being qualiﬁed
by a property before we even understand anything about how it is qualiﬁed by this
property. For example, we would usually become aware that a speciﬁc object ac-
tually exists before we understand why it exists. In order to ascertain the ground
of the object’s existence, we then have to consider further factors. Whenever an
object comes into existence at a given moment in time and later ceases to exist,
we have to conclude that its existence is contingent and therefore depends on
6
an act of creation. If, however, the object in question exists eternally, it must
necessarily have an eternal ground that causes it to exist. It was, therefore, only
a logical further step to classify attributes according to the manner or modality
(kayﬁyya) by which they become actual (thabata). Richard Frank was the ﬁrst to
make a comprehensive attempt to reconstruct this classiﬁcation on the basis of
Bahshamī sources from the fourth/tenth to early ﬁfth/eleventh centuries (Frank
1978; Frank 1982b: 345f.).
Since Abū Hāshim’s own writings are no longer extant, his original typology
of attributes cannot be securely established. It appears, however, quite likely that
he distinguished between various types of attributes according to their causes,
since this is a common feature of later accounts of the theory. This picture is
also conﬁrmed by Ashʿarite discussions of the Bahshamī theory of attributes (Gi-
maret 1970). Nonetheless, any attempt to reconstruct Abū Hāshim’s original
thought remains speculative and therefore controversial, because the extant lit-
erature composed by his later followers does not provide a uniﬁed picture of the
classiﬁcation of attributes.
In a more recent interpretation of Abū Hāshim’s theory of aḥwāl, Ahmed
Alami fundamentally questioned whether the manner by which attributes be-
come actual represented a criterion for AbūHāshim and his school’s classiﬁcation
of attributes. Rather, Alami interprets Abū Hāshim’s notion of ḥāl as constitut-
ing a central element of a new ontology of immanence, which is founded on
three ‘modes’. According to Alami, each of these ‘modes’ has the same mean-
ing when applied to God and His creatures. Based on this assumption, Alami
detects in Abū Hāshim’s theory an ‘ontology of univocity’ between divine and
created beings, that radically broke with the transcendentalism of earlier thinkers
(Alami 2001). New Bahshamī sources have come to light since Alami’s publica-
tion, including treatises that deal with the theory of attributes in a much more
comprehensive fashion than the texts explored by him and Frank. In the light of
these ﬁndings, both Alami’s rejection of the classiﬁcation of attributes according
to causal criteria and his immanentist reading of the notion of ḥāl appear highly
problematic. The texts rather conﬁrm the overall understanding of the theory as
outlined by Frank, but also allow further reﬁnement of his analysis (Thiele 2013:
131–200).
In relation to the classiﬁcation of attributes, there appears to be much com-
mon ground in the Bahshamī sources. Aside from some categories that are central
to the theory, there are variations in some deﬁnitions of speciﬁc categories and
also in their precise number. These variations probably emerged according to
developments in different periods and regions, which were the natural result of
the spread of Bahshamī teachings over a wide geographic area and continuing
reﬁnements within the school tradition over several centuries.
(1) A category of attributes that consistently ﬁgures in Bahshamī accounts,
called al-ṣifa al-dhātiyya, ṣifat al-dhāt, or al-ṣifa al-nafsiyya, is commonly ren-
dered in modern studies as the ‘attribute of the essence’. This type of
attribute describes or deﬁnes what a thing is in itself. It identiﬁes speciﬁc
objects in such expressions as ‘the atom’s being an atom’ (kawn al-jawhar
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jawharan). In other words, qualifying something as an atom distinguishes
it from other objects that are not atoms, such as, for example, God or
the colour black.
Since a qualiﬁcation expressed by the ‘attribute of the essence’ describes what
an object fundamentally is, it is not grounded in or conditioned by any other
entity. An atom is only described as being an atom because it is what it is. There
is nothing outside this object that necessarily causes it either to be or to eventually
become an atom.
Since the identity of an object ﬁnds its expression in the ‘attribute of the
essence’, the Bahshamīs regard this attribute as the ground or basis on which
something is intelligible and thereby becomes an object of knowledge (maʿlūm).
Two different things, such as the accidents of the colours black and white, are
distinguishable because they do not share their ‘attribute of the essence’. Accord-
ingly, the Bahshamīs spoke of similarity between any two things whenever their
‘attribute of the essence’ was interchangeable.
Unlike any other category of attributes, the ‘attribute of the essence’ has an
eternal and necessary reality, irrespective of whether or not the qualiﬁed object
actually exists. This theory allowed the Bahshamīs to account for how the actual
existent can be known and also the non-existent or the possible. Furthermore, it
also gave them a ﬁrm basis on which to argue that God is eternally omniscient,
that is, that He also knows His creatures before they come into existence.
The ‘attributes of the essence’ of created things were, as a rule, derived from
the terms that denote particular objects—such as the atom’s being an atom (kawn
al-jawhar jawharan) or the colour black’s being black (kawn al-sawād sawādan). In
contrast, when applied to God the ‘attribute of the essence’ was deﬁned by vari-
ous Bahshamī theologians in different terms. It appears that most of the earlier
texts identiﬁed the ‘attribute of the essence’ with God’s ‘being eternal’ (kawnuhu
qadīman)—a position that was adopted from Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (Gimaret 1970:
73f.; Frank 1978: 53, 68, 86 n. 57). In particular, Zaydī scholars inclined to
Bahshamī teachings—including the Persian al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101)
and scholars belonging to the Yemeni strand founded in the sixth/twelfth century
such as al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ (d. 584/1188)—preferred instead to speak of ‘God’s
most characteristic attribute’ (ṣifat Allāh al-akhaṣṣ) (Thiele 2013: 164f.). Although
the sources are silent about this inconsistency in identifying God’s ‘attribute of the
essence’, a reasonable argument for the latter choice may have been that the idea
of God’s eternity was too closely related, if not tantamount, to His being eternally
existent. As will be seen, God’s attribute of existence—or more precisely ‘His be-
ing eternally existent’ (kawnuhu mawjūdan fīmā lam yazal)—was, however, considered
an attribute belonging to the following category of attributes, that is one of those
four attributes entailed by God’s ‘attribute of the essence’.
(2) The second category of attributes constitutes a fundamental pillar of
Abū Hāshim’s solution to the problem of attributes. By afﬁrming the
ḥāl as an ontological reality, AbūHāshim introduced a new concept that
had not been considered by earlierMuʿtazilites as a potential ground for
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the attributes of beings. He did not conceive of the reality of the ḥāl as an
existing entity that is distinct from the qualiﬁed being but instead under-
stood it as a manner of being. Consequently, Abū Hāshim was able to
explain the foundation of speciﬁc properties, distinct from the descrip-
tion of things in themselves, without having to posit any other entity as
the ground of the property in question. For example, the Bahshamīs rea-
soned that any existing atommust occupy space (taḥayyaza). However, af-
ﬁrming that an atom occupies space is not, according to the Bahshamīs,
a description or deﬁnition of the atom as such. The only property an
atom possesses by virtue of itself is ‘its being an atom’ (kawnuhu jawha-
ran), that is, its ‘attribute of the essence’. Nevertheless, simply describ-
ing something as an atom already implies that it occupies space when
it is brought into existence. The Bahshamīs therefore argued that the
ground for an atom occupying spacemust be its ‘attribute of the essence’,
that is, a ḥāl, and that the ḥāl is effective once the atom exists. The idea
that one attribute could effect another was only conceivable because
according to Abū Hāshim’s theory of aḥwāl the attribute was no longer
regarded as a pure utterance, but instead was considered to be ontolog-
ically real.
The same reasoning was applied to God’s eternal attributes. Since it is in the
very nature of God that He is necessarily existent, capable of creating the world,
omniscient, and living, the Bahshamīs regarded these properties as entailed by
His ‘attribute of the essence’. Unlike al-Naẓẓām or Abū ʿAlī, the Bahshamīs
thereby rejected that these attributes are directly grounded in God as He is in
Himself (li-nafsihi/li-dhātihi), since none of the four aforementioned eternal prop-
erties expresses the fullness of His being. Consequently, predicating that He is
God has to be distinguished from predicating that He is eternally powerful, know-
ing, living or existing. For the Bahshamīs, He is characterized by these properties
because He is God. From a reverse perspective, the knowledge that He is God (i.e.
that what He is in Himself) is inferred from the knowledge that He is eternally
powerful, knowing, living, and existent.
As is the case with the four characteristics God necessarily has, attributes that
are in turn effected by other attributes can have eternal reality. Unlike the ‘at-
tributes of the essence’, however, they are not eternal by themselves. Rather,
they are eternal because the conditions for attributes like God’s being powerful,
knowing, living, and existing are eternally fulﬁlled: God’s ‘attribute of the essence’
unconditionally effects His being existent, which is the only prerequisite for His
being living, and in turn being living is the condition for His being powerful and
knowing. It has to be noted that the hierarchical order between these four at-
tributes is a mere logical dependence and that none of them temporally follows
another.
Moreover, attributes of this category that stand apart from God’s eternal at-
tributes have a temporal reality, since they are conditioned by the temporal exis-
tence of the object they qualify. An atom’s occupying space is, for example, only
a necessary property of an atom during the limited period of its existence.
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The Bahshamīs employed the verb iqtaḍā (‘to entail’) to describe the way in
which one attribute causes another attribute. The effective attribute was there-
fore denoted by the active participle (al-muqtaḍī ) and the effected attribute as al-ṣifa
al-muqtaḍāt. In Bahshamī texts, we ﬁnd a narrow and a broader deﬁnition of what
can be termed as belonging to the category of ‘entailed attributes’. In particular,
the earlier extant works restrict the ṣifāt muqtaḍāt to those attributes that become
actual by virtue of the ‘attribute of the essence’ whenever a thing comes into
existence—such as the atom’s occupying space or God’s four eternal attributes.
Occasionally, these sources speak of al-ṣifa al-muqtaḍāt ʿan ṣifat al-dhāt (i.e. ‘the at-
tribute entailed by the “attribute of the essence”’). Later Bahshamī theologians
from the late ﬁfth/eleventh century onwards, and primarily their Yemeni repre-
sentatives, tended to broaden the deﬁnition of the ṣifāt muqtaḍāt to any kind of
attribute that is grounded in another attribute (Thiele 2013: 146f.).
In his analysis of the Bahshamī theory of attributes, Richard Frank only deals
with the narrow deﬁnition of the ṣifāt muqtaḍāt for which he suggests the transla-
tion ‘essential attributes’. In fact, the attributes entailed by the ‘attribute of the
essence’ do not describe things as what they are in themselves, but they some-
times reveal the distinctiveness of the ‘attribute of the essence’ by which they are
effected. The reasoning behind this was that some attributes can only be entailed
by a speciﬁc ‘attribute of the essence’. For example, something described as oc-
cupying space can only be identiﬁed as an atom, because no other class of being
can occupy space. Therefore, the attribute of ‘occupying space’ (kawnuhu mutaḥayy-
izan) must necessarily be entailed by the atom’s ‘attribute of the essence’ (kawnuhu
jawharan), so that ‘the atom’s being an atom’ becomes manifest through ‘its oc-
cupying space’ (= the ṣifa muqtaḍāt). Although Frank’s translation of ṣifa muqtaḍāt
by ‘essential attribute’ makes sense in this context, it does not sufﬁciently clarify
the central distinction in the Bahshamī theory between ṣifat al-dhāt (i.e. the ﬁrst
category in the typology of attributes) and ṣifa muqtaḍāt. In some cases, the transla-
tion ‘essential attribute’ is even inappropriate, because it is not applicable to the
broader understanding of ṣifa muqtaḍāt and does not render the exact sense of the
Arabic term.
(3) The category of the attributes effected by an agent (al-ṣifāt bi-l-fāʿil/al-
mustaḥaqqa bi-l-fāʿil/al-ḥāṣila bi-l-fāʿil) has to be understood in the frame-
work of the Bahshamī theory of existence. According to this theory, not
only the existent but also the non-existent is considered as a potential
object of knowledge. The Bahshamīs therefore strictly distinguished be-
tween the attribute that describes a thing in itself and its attribute of
existence. Consequently, predicating that an object is an atom has a
different meaning than asserting that the atom exists. Whereas the for-
mer predication merely expresses that I know the object as being an
atom, the latter asserts that I know the atom as being existent. Things
can therefore be known irrespective of whether or not they actually exist.
Existence is thus a supplemental quality, and in the case of created be-
ings, it is only temporal and possible, as opposed to the eternal reality of
the ‘attribute of the essence’ by virtue of which all things are knowable.
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Bahshamī theologians argued that the existence of created beings cannot be
grounded in the qualiﬁed being itself. Instead, their possible existence must be
founded on an exterior reason that is not necessarily effective. According to the
Bahshamī theory of causation, only autonomous agents (fāʿil) are effective in such
a way that they could refrain equally from producing their effect and vice versa:
agents never act necessarily, since their ability to perform an act always implies
the ability to do the opposite. The Muʿtazilite school regarded God and human
beings as autonomous agents, each of which has different capacities: since God is
omnipotent, He is able to bring atoms and accidents into existence, while human
abilities are restricted to the creation of certain accidents only.
The temporal attribute of existence is not the only attribute that was consid-
ered as belonging to the category of attributes effected by agents. The Bahshamīs
also included further qualities derived from an object’s coming into existence. If,
for example, an act of creation is motivated by speciﬁc intentions, the created ob-
ject is further qualiﬁed by additional attributes that are correlated to the agent’s
will. The act then occurs ‘in a speciﬁc manner’ (ʿalā wajh): depending on the inten-
tions of the agent, speech can, for example, be uttered as a command, a statement
or a question.
(4) The Bahshamīs agreed with a predominant theory among theologians
that was used to explain the changing properties of bodies. They
claimed that such contingent properties are grounded in accidents that
inhere in the discrete parts of bodies. According to this idea, a moving
(mutaḥarrik) body is the substrate of accidents of motion (ḥaraka), a resting
(sākin) body is inhered by accidents of rest (sukūn), etc. In the Bahshamī
terminology, such accidents are called ʿilla or maʿnā. These terms gave
their name to the category of attributes caused by an accident: they
are called ṣifāt maʿnawiyya, li-maʿnā or li-ʿilla. Like attributes effected by
an agent, these ‘accidental’ properties are grounded in an entity other
than the qualiﬁed object.
Within the classical ontology of kalām, accidents belong to the group of created
beings and have, by deﬁnition, possible existence. This explains why the attributes
grounded in accidents are temporal and possible, since their reality depends on
the existence of accidents: a moving body only moves as long as it is a substrate of
accidents of movement; it still continues to exist when it stops moving and even
could exist without ever having moved.
The Bahshamī notion of ‘accidental attributes’ also includes such attributes
as men’s being knowing, capable of action and living. As opposed to God, these
attributes do not necessarily qualify the human body: some people are unable
to perform certain acts which others are able to perform, human knowledge is
restricted, and humankind’s life limited. Ontologically, human imperfection was
interpreted as a non-presence of such accidents by virtue of which he would be
knowing or able to perform certain acts; and death, too, was conceived as the
absence of an accident of life.
(5) A ﬁfth category of attributes is frequently mentioned in the writings
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of the prominent fourth/tenth-century theologian ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d.
415/1025) and his students, but is increasingly absent in later Bahshamī
sources. This group of attributes is said to be grounded neither in the
qualiﬁed object nor in another entity (lā li-l-nafs wa-lā li-maʿnā), and ap-
plied to the attribute of being perceiving (kawnuhu mudrikan). Against his
father’s position, Abū Hāshim maintained that perception is not an ac-
cident like the will or human knowledge. He argued that living beings
are perceiving whenever an object of perception exists, unless they suf-
fer from physical defects. Consequently, God is not eternally perceiving,
although He possesses all necessary prerequisites: since His creation is
only temporal, He cannot perceive it from pre-eternity. Abū Hāshim
therefore claimed that the attribute of being perceiving is effected by the
attribute of being living, provided that all conditions are fulﬁlled.
While Bahshamī theologians agreed that beings are perceiving by virtue of an
attribute, and so neither by the perceiver himself (li-l-nafs) nor by another entity
(li-maʿnā), they differed about the necessity of positing a category in its own right
for the attribute of perception. Towards the second half of the ﬁfth/eleventh cen-
tury, the Ḥanafī Bahshamī scholar al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101) appears
to have been one of the ﬁrst to omit the ﬁfth category. In his ‘Book on the effect
and the effector’ (Kitāb al-Taʾthīr wa-l-muʾaththir), he cites the attribute of perception
as an example of an attribute ‘entailed’ (muqtaḍā) by another attribute and appar-
ently concluded it to be considered as analogous to the atom’s occupying space or
God’s eternal attributes (Thiele 2012: 308). Nevertheless, al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī’s
position was inconsistent. In other theological works, he stuck to the concept
of attributes that are neither grounded in the qualiﬁed object nor in another en-
tity and associated it with the attribute of perception. It was only among later
Yemeni Zaydīs inclined to Bahshamī doctrines that the quadripartite classiﬁca-
tion became the predominant doctrine. By adopting a broader understanding of
the ṣifāt muqtaḍāt and deﬁning them as any attribute entailed by another attribute,
the ﬁfth category of attributes eventually became obsolete: the attribute of per-
ception then fulﬁls all conditions for classiﬁcation as an ‘entailed attribute’ (Thiele
2013: 146f., 167f.).
The most comprehensive and systematic account of the theory of attributes
we possess is relatively late. It was written by the sixth/twelfth century Zaydī
theologian al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ, who belonged to the founding generation of a
new Bahshamī school in Yemen. His treatise on attributes exhibits some features
of later conceptual developments, e.g. a consistent reduction of the formerly ﬁve
to four categories. In addition, al-Raṣṣāṣ adopts a genuine approach that provides
insightful perspectives on how the classiﬁcation outlined above could be used in
theological reﬂections and argumentations.
Al-Raṣṣāṣ addresses the topic of attributes in a manner that could be charac-
terized as an epistemological approach. Bearing in mind that in Bahshamī teach-
ing, attributes or ‘states’ are not conceived as objects of knowledge, but as that
by which ‘things’ (ashyāʾ/dhawāt) are known, al-Raṣṣāṣ’ intention was to explore
systematically what each category of attributes reveals about things. The ques-
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tion arose since a number of predications that were made of God were equally
made of created beings. Moreover, the Bahshamīs maintained that whenever a
property is predicated of various subjects, the afﬁrmed ḥāl is univocal. Being able
to act (kawnuhu qādiran) has one and the same meaning for all beings capable of
autonomous actions: it entails the possibility that a subject performs an act and
that an act occurs by virtue of the agent’s capability. In this sense, afﬁrming that
God is able to act is tantamount to predicating the same about human beings,
although God is necessarily capable of actions while human abilities are only pos-
sible ones. Necessity and possibility are, however, only modalities (kayﬁyyāt) of the
same ḥāl (Frank 1978: 66–72; Alami 2001: 101–39).
Nonetheless, the Bahshamīs certainly did not intend to claim that two sub-
jects with a common attribute are necessarily alike. In order to avoid any an-
thropomorphic misinterpretations of their thought, they had to answer an essen-
tial theological question: how can it be true that God is knowing in the same
sense as humans are, without undermining God’s absolute transcendence? It
was precisely this issue to which al-Raṣṣāṣ responded through his epistemologi-
cal approach. For each category of attributes, he establishes a set of criteria to
analyse whether a common attribute shared by two things reveals a similarity
between the qualiﬁed beings or between that in which the common attribute is
grounded. As explained by al-Raṣṣāṣ, attributes caused by the presence of an
accident (al-ṣifāt al-maʿnawiyya) and attributes entailed by another attribute (al-ṣifāt
al-muqtaḍāt) are, for example, not by themselves a sufﬁcient indication as to the
identity of the qualiﬁed being. An attribute like being living can be a possible or
a necessary property. Whenever a being is contingently living, it is so by virtue of
an accident that inheres in a created body, whereas the necessarily living refers
to God, who is living by virtue of His ‘attribute of the essence’. The fact that God
and His creatures share the attribute of being living, however, neither means that
they are living for the same reason, nor that they resemble each other in any way.
Therefore, ‘accidental attributes’ and attributes grounded in other attributes are
not by themselves an indication of the identity of all beings described by the same
predicate.
Through an additional feature, al-Raṣṣāṣ’ analysis further expands the per-
spective encountered in other sources: he also takes into consideration the so-
called aḥkām (sing. ḥukm), i.e. ‘characteristics’, that are ontologically distinct from
attributes or aḥwāl. The notion of ḥukm already occurs in our earliest Bahshamī
sources, but the concept remains rather obscure. It appears that the Bahshamī
understanding of the term ḥukm was only elaborated under the impact of Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044). Abū l-Ḥusayn was a student of the eminent
qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī, but he had also been trained in medicine
and philosophy. His education awakened him to new perspectives, leading him
to criticize some principles of Bahshamī theology in an attempt to defend Muʿ-
tazilite teachings against their opponents. He was, therefore, harshly attacked by
his Bahshamī fellows.
Abū l-Ḥusayn’s theological teaching is mainly known through the works of
his later follower, Rukn al-Dīn Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141). It is in Ibn al-
Malāḥimī’s writings that we ﬁnd the earliest account of a clear conceptual dis-
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tinction between ṣifa and ḥukm. His deﬁnition of the two terms is subsequently
quoted in Bahshamī sources from Yemen, namely in the writings of al-Raṣṣāṣ’
and later Zaydī scholars, who generally tend to reject Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s
and Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s teachings. According to this understanding, ṣifāt and aḥkām
differ in the manner in which things are known through them. Unlike attributes,
we have to consider two objects qualiﬁed by the same ḥukm to infer knowledge
about a thing. In contrast, it sufﬁces to consider only one subject qualiﬁed by
the attribute of living to know the subject as being living. In analogy to the at-
tributes, al-Raṣṣāṣ establishes three categories of aḥkām: a ﬁrst category effected
by an autonomous agent (al-aḥkām al-mustaḥaqqa bi-l-fāʿil), a second grounded in
an accident (al-aḥkām al-maʿnawiyya) and a third category of aḥkām entailed by an
attribute (al-aḥkām al-muqtaḍāt). Following the pattern of exploring the attributes,
al-Raṣṣāṣ also establishes for the three categories of aḥkām whether they reveal a
similarity of what they qualify (Thiele 2013: 131–200).
The case of al-Raṣṣāṣ brings to our attention the fact that Bahshamī theolo-
gians developed, on the basis of Abū Hāshim’s concept of ḥāl, different perspec-
tives on, and approaches to, the classiﬁcation of attributes. The Bahshamī theory
of attributes was, consequently, not transmitted as a static system, but rather un-
derwent continuous modiﬁcations and diachronic developments.
IV. The Adaption of the Concept of ḥāl by
Ashʿarite Theologians
The story of al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935), the eponym of the Ashʿariyya school, is well
known. He belonged to the circle of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī’s students and followed
Muʿtazilite teachings until he abandoned his teacher’s school at the age of about
40. Instead of adopting the pure scripturalist doctrine of the Muʿtazilites’ oppo-
nents, he sought to ﬁnd a compromise between rationalism and traditionalism—
an approach that had already been sketched out by the third/ninth century the-
ologian Ibn Kullāb (d. c. 240/854).
Al-Ashʿarī’s teaching on God’s attributes appears to have followed the ma-
jor axioms of Ibn Kullāb’s theory. Consequently, it differed signiﬁcantly from
the Muʿtazilite interpretation: al-Ashʿarī afﬁrms that God’s attributes are real
entities (maʿānī ), and that knowledge (ʿilm), life (ḥayāt), power (qudra), etc. ‘subsist’
(taqūmu) in Him. These entities are denoted by al-Ashʿarī as ṣifāt, and he posits that
they actually exist. The notion of ṣifa is, in this sense, analogous to the accidents
(aʿrāḍ) of created bodies: both are termed maʿānī, that is entities, whose presence
necessitates a qualiﬁcation of the object to which the maʿnā belongs.
According to al-Ashʿarī, the descriptive term has, unlike its entitative ground,
no reality: for him, afﬁrming that God is knowing (ʿālim) refers to His entitative
knowledge (ʿilm), while he identiﬁed the descriptive term ‘knowing’ (ʿālim) with
the act of attribution (waṣf ), that is a pure utterance without any extralinguistic
reality (in this respect, his position was nearer to that of Abū ʿAlī than that of Abū
Hāshim). It has, however, to be noted that in his extant writings, al-Ashʿarī did
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not consistently distinguish between ṣifa and waṣf. In a predication such as ‘God
is knowing’ (Allāh ʿālim), ṣifa can, consequently, refer to His entitative knowledge
(ʿilm) and to the descriptive term ‘knowing’ (ʿālim) (Gimaret 1990: 235–43).
Considering the central concern of monotheism to Muslim theologians, al-
Ashʿarī’s conception of God’s attributes inevitably raised a fundamental question:
if entitative knowledge, power, life, will, etc. eternally exist in Him, how then
could it be true that He is one and free from multiplicity of any kind? Al-Ashʿarī
countered the problem by afﬁrming that the ṣifāt, that is God’s entitative attributes,
are neither identical with, nor other than Him (Gimaret 1990: 276–81).
The theories of al-Ashʿarī and his contemporary Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī were
opposed to each other in a complex manner, in particular because the two theolo-
gians did not apply their terminology in the same way. In al-Ashʿarī’s teaching,
the ṣifāt denote entities that are not identical with GodHimself, by virtue of which
He is described by eternal properties. From the Muʿtazilite standpoint, positing
the existence of eternal entities in God was unacceptable for the reasons previ-
ously explained. Therefore, the Muʿtazilites often faced the reproach of negating
the ṣifāt. This objection is, however, not entirely correct, as far as Abū Hāshim
and his followers are concerned: Bahshamī theologians did afﬁrm the ontological
reality of ṣifāt, but not in the same sense al-Ashʿarī afﬁrmed it. For the Bahshamīs,
ṣifāt are not conceived as entitative grounds of predications about God, but rather
as a ‘manner of being’, a ḥāl. Al-Ashʿarī, in turn, rejected the idea that properties
which are predicated of beings have, unlike their entitative grounds, a reality. In
this respect, al-Ashʿarī agreed with his and Abū Hāshim’s teacher Abū ʿAlī, for
whom an afﬁrmation that God is knowing or living is only an act of predication
(waṣf ), i.e. nothing but words.
The rejection of the concept of ḥāl still prevailed among the ﬁrst followers
of al-Ashʿarī. It was only two generations after the school’s founder that a ma-
jor representative of the Ashʿariyya, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, adopted the concept.
Al-Bāqillānī’s position on the notion of ḥāl was, however, not consistent. In his
Kitāb al-Tamhīd, he devotes a whole chapter to refuting Abū Hāshim’s concept.
Nonetheless, it is well known from the writings of later Ashʿarites that al-Bāqillānī
eventually came to approve of the notion of ḥāl and that he maintained it in his
magnum opus, the Hidāyat al-mustarshidīn. His change in opinion can be explained,
as has been convincingly argued, by the chronology of al-Bāqillānī’s works: the
Tamhīd was in fact one of al-Bāqillānī’s earliest works and merely represents a
compilation of his masters’ teachings, rather than his independent thought (Gi-
maret 1970: 76f.; Gimaret 1980: 94f.). Not surprisingly, al-Bāqillānī’s framing of
the divine attributes in the Tamhīd merely follows al-Ashʿarī’s position. His main
concern appears to have been to arrange al-Ashʿarī’s teachings in a coherent line
of argumentation by employing a systematized terminology (Allard 1965: 299–
312). Al-Bāqillānī’s approval of the concept of ḥāl must consequently have been a
revision of his early position, possibly developed under the impact of his debates
with Muʿtazilite scholars.
For long, modern scholarship had to rely on later accounts of al-Bāqillānī’s
adoption of the notion of ḥāl, such as the writings of Abū l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī,
who equally approved it. Since al-Juwaynī’s teaching was signiﬁcantly shaped
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by philosophical notions and theories, we have to be careful about identifying
his position with that of al-Bāqillānī. Only the recent manuscript discoveries of
substantial parts of the Hidāya provide a sound basis for an examination of al-
Bāqillānī’s original theory (Gimaret 2009; Schmidtke 2011).
As has already been observed for al-Juwaynī, al-Bāqillānī did not insist on
an unconditional subscription to the theory of aḥwāl. Both theologians were less
categorical, possibly because they were aware that the theory encountered much
reservation among Ashʿarite theologians. Therefore al-Bāqillānī often presents in
his Hidāya two alternative lines of argumentation whenever discussing questions
related to attributes, and so his audience was able to follow his reasoning irrespec-
tive of whether or not they approved the notion of ḥāl (Gimaret 1970: 78; Thiele
forthcoming).
Considering some obvious analogies with the Bahshamī concept, there is no
doubt that al-Bāqillānī’s notion of ḥāl was borrowed from his theological adver-
saries. Following Abū Hāshim’s original reasoning, he revised his earlier under-
standing of the ontological reality expressed through predications about things.
Against his position in the Tamhīd, that was in fact in accordance with that of al-
Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī assigned in hisHidāya a reality to such properties that cannot
be described by the dichotomy of existence and non-existence (Thiele forthcom-
ing). The same position was also later adopted by al-Juwaynī (Gimaret 1970:
79). When al-Bāqillānī introduced the notion of ḥāl, he did not use it as an al-
ternative to the concept of entitative attributes, which was in fact Abū Hāshim’s
primary preoccupation. Al-Bāqillānī rather combines the traditional Ashʿarite
understanding of ṣifa with the notion of ḥāl. As is developed in the Hidāya, a
ḥāl like God’s ‘being knowing’ (kawnuhu ʿāliman) is founded in an actually existing
‘knowledge’ (ʿilm), which is termed a ṣifa or an entitative ground (maʿnā) for His
being so. Al-Bāqillānī explains his reasoning by referring to al-Ashʿarī’s principle
that a speciﬁc predication has always the same sense or expresses the same truth
(ḥaqīqa): if we posit a maʿnā, that is an entity of knowledge (ʿilm) as necessarily be-
longing to a human being described as knowing, the same holds true for God,
so that He equally cannot be knowing but by virtue of a maʿnā (Thiele forthcom-
ing). Similarly, al-Ashʿarī held that that which expressions like ‘being knowing’
(ʿālim) refer to must always be the same: therefore, ‘being knowing’ cannot refer in
one case to the object of predication (nafs) and in another case to a distinct entity
(maʿnā). Instead, ʿālim has always the same meaning (ḥaqīqa) in that it is equivalent
to asserting an entity of knowledge that belongs to the object qualiﬁed as know-
ing (lahu ʿilm) (Frank 1982a: 270). Al-Bāqillānī’s adoption of the concept of ḥāl
did not replace the theory of his predecessors but rather expanded its conceptual
framework.
Consequently, al-Bāqillānī and later al-Juwaynī had to adjust the concept of
ḥāl to the doctrinal frame of the Ashʿarite school. A major modiﬁcation of the
original Bahshamī notion concerned a point of criticism al-Bāqillānī had made
to substantiate his earlier rejection of the concept of ḥāl as a whole. In the Tamhīd,
he argues that the Bahshamī position was, in itself, contradictory, in that it posited
that (1) an agent who is capable of performing a certain act (qādir) must be dis-
tinguished from somebody incapable of the same act by a feature which has, by
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way of a ḥāl, an ontological reality; and (2) that, by deﬁnition, a ḥāl as a non-entity
cannot be known. How then, al-Bāqillānī argues, can the ḥāl be established as a
differentiating and ontologically real feature, if there is no way for it to be known?
When al-Bāqillānī later approved the reality of the ḥāl, he took his earlier objec-
tion into consideration and argued that a ḥālmust necessarily be knowable (maʿlūm)
even though it is not an entity (dhāt). The reasoning behind this was that if two
things are qualiﬁed by the same ḥāl, we are able to detect their identity, and so
we can distinguish it from a different ḥāl—as, for example, when we differentiate
between ‘living’ and ‘knowing’ (Thiele forthcoming).
Even more important is, however, that al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī no longer
used the concept of ḥāl for the same purposes as the Bahshamīs did in their meta-
physics. As was previously explained, the aḥwāl served in Bahshamī theology to
reconcile God’s oneness with the plurality of His properties. In this context, the
ḥāl fulﬁls a crucial purpose in that it is conceived as having a non-entitative reality
and thereby acts as a neither existent nor non-existent ground for entailing (iqtaḍā)
other predications. In the Ashʿarite context, however, the original Bahshamī no-
tion of iqtiḍāʾ is not taken over. Consequently, al-Juwaynī’s classiﬁcation of the
aḥwāl does not include a category of attributes caused by other attributes that
would be comparable to the Bahshamī category ṣifāt muqtaḍāt.
In fact, the Ashʿarite teaching on the non-existent and the possible rendered
the Bahshamī distinction between the ‘attribute of the essence’ and the attributes
‘entailed’ by the ‘attribute of the essence’ of existent things obsolete. Whereas
the Bahshamīs afﬁrmed the reality of the ‘attribute of the essence’ of even non-
existing things, the non-existent lacks, according to the Ashʿarites, any positive
qualiﬁcation. For them, it has no reality and is not considered a thing (laysa bi-
shayʾ ) (Frank 2000). Accordingly, predications that describe things as what they
are in themselves (such as ‘the atom is an atom’, ‘the colour black is black’, etc.)
and those speciﬁc qualiﬁcations that things necessarily have when they exist (such
as the atom’s occupying space) are both inseparably linked to existence. Sticking
to the example of the atom, the traditional Ashʿarite teaching posited that atoms
cannot possibly be conceived as atoms unless they actually exist. In addition, an
existing atom cannot be imagined but as occupying space and vice versa. There-
fore, being an atom, being an entity, being existent and occupying space are,
ontologically speaking, tantamount to each other in that each of these qualities
afﬁrms the reality of an atom. Essentially, these predications are founded in the
atom itself and they are therefore only distinguished from a logical point of view.
Accordingly, al-Juwaynī only distinguishes between two classes of predicates
in his classiﬁcation of the aḥwāl: one category that is grounded in a distinctly
existing entity (muʿallal), and another category of which this is not the case (ghayr
muʿallal). Alternatively, al-Juwaynī also refers to these categories as those attributes
afﬁrming the reality of the qualiﬁed thing itself (ṣifat ithbāt li-dhāt qāʾima bihā or ṣifa
nafsiyya, i.e. the latter ‘non-grounded’ attributes) and those afﬁrming the existence
of a maʿnā, that is an entity subsisting in the qualiﬁed being by virtue of which the
ḥāl becomes actual (thābit li-l-dhāt ʿan maʿnā or ṣifa maʿnawiyya) (Frank 2004: 771–7).
Despite its terminological similarity, the Ashʿarite concept of the ṣifa nafsiyya is
sharply distinguished from its homologue in the Bahshamī theory. Whereas the
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Bahshamīs identiﬁed a single predicate that expresses the fullness of its being for
each entity, the Ashʿarites established a set of properties to frame the distinctive-
ness of any individual class of beings. For the reasons previously explained, they
regarded the totality of these properties as deﬁning a thing as such. It is in this
particular context that the translation of ḥāl by ‘states’ has been problematized.
The inappropriateness of the translation ‘state’ can be exempliﬁed by the case
of the atom: the Ashʿarites explicitly denied that, ontologically speaking, the ex-
istence of atoms can be distinguished from their ‘being an atom’, and so they
claimed with regard to all other attributes afﬁrming the atom itself (or the ‘es-
sential attributes’, i.e. the ṣifāt nafsiyya). Unlike the Bahshamīs, the Ashʿarites
consequently did not conceive of existence and non-existence as two different
conditions or circumstances under which atoms have reality. Nor did they agree
with the Bahshamī theory, that atoms do not necessarily occupy space unless they
actually exist. For that reason, such predications as ‘the atom exists’ or ‘the atom
occupies space’ cannot be considered as changing states because they are nec-
essarily implied by the meaning expressed by describing something as an atom.
According to the Ashʿarites, predicating that the atom is an atom, that it exists and
occupies space, denote various aspects which, in their totality, describe the atom
as what it is in itself. Therefore, it was recently suggested by Richard Frank to
translate ḥāl in the Ashʿarite context as ‘feature’. Beyond the ṣifāt nafsiyya, the prob-
lematic of translating ḥāl as ‘state’ equally applies to God’s ‘grounded attributes’
(ṣifāt maʿnawiyya or muʿallala), since, according to classical Ashʿarite teaching, the
entitative grounds (maʿānī ) for such predications as God’s ‘being powerful’ and
His ‘being knowing’ are neither identical with, nor other than, Him. In other
words, the necessary presence of power and knowledge in God does not, accord-
ing to the Ashʿarites, entail any multiplicity in Him, although He is not power
and knowledge. Consequently, God’s existence is inconceivable unless power,
knowledge etc. subsist in Him and so it is impossible to afﬁrm God’s reality with-
out afﬁrming that He is powerful, knowing etc. In this respect, God’s ‘grounded
attributes’ are similar to the ṣifāt nafsiyya in that they denote distinct features that
a subject necessarily has (Frank 2004: 771–6).
When Ashʿarite theologians started adopting the concept of ḥāl, they came to
use the term ḥukm frequently when referring to the properties of beings. By doing
so, it appears that al-Bāqillānī and later supporters of the theory of aḥwāl strove
to resolve a terminological ambiguity with regard to the term ṣifa. In the classical
Ashʿarite vocabulary, ṣifa was applied to God’s entitative knowledge, power, and
so forth (ʿilm, qudra, etc.), that is, the so-called maʿānī in which some of His proper-
ties are founded. Because the Muʿtazilites negated the existence of eternal entita-
tive attributes, they were blamed by the Ashʿarites for denying the ṣifāt, although
this reproach was polemical if not inappropriate, in particular when it comes to
the Bahshamī theory of aḥwāl. When Ashʿarite scholars eventually incorporated
the concept of ḥāl in their theological system, they afﬁrmed the ontological real-
ity of both the entitative grounds of predications and the properties which they
predicated. When applied to God, the term ṣifa was, however, coined in classi-
cal Ashʿarite terminology to denote the maʿnā, that is the entitative grounds (ʿilm,
qudra...) for such predications as ‘He is knowing’, ‘He is powerful’ etc. (kawnuhu ʿāli-
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man, qādiran...). It was therefore necessary to distinguish terminologically between
the ground (i.e. the ṣifa in its traditional meaning of maʿnā) and the effect (i.e. the
ḥāl or the ṣifa muʿallala as it termed by al-Juwaynī). Therefore, al-Bāqillānī and
later Ashʿarites avoid using ṣifa whenever referring to ontologically real proper-
ties (i.e. the aḥwāl) and tend to employ the term ḥukm as a synonym for ḥāl (Frank
2004).
V. Conclusion
The theory of aḥwāl was formulated in response to the problem how God’s one-
ness can be reconciled with the idea that He is qualiﬁed by a multitude of eternal
qualities. The question had been debated over several generations of theologians
before Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī suggested a solution by borrowing from the gram-
marians a new ontological category: he conceived of attributes as neither existing
nor non-existing ‘states’ (aḥwāl) and thereby avoided ascribing to them an entita-
tive reality. Abū Hāshim’s theory was highly successful in that it became a cen-
tral pillar in the theological system of his followers for many centuries. Over the
course of this time, the theory of aḥwāl was modiﬁed and elaborated in various
aspects, so that theologians applied it with different focuses of interest, including
merely epistemological approaches.
The impact of Abū Hāshim’s theory was not conﬁned to the theological
tradition that was named after him as Bahshamiyya. With al-Bāqillānī, the
concept of ḥāl was also introduced into and adapted to the framework of
Ashʿarite theology. Al-Bāqillānī’s adoption of the theory of aḥwāl was also
approved by later Ashʿarites, including the outstanding imām al-ḥaramayn Abū
l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī and even later by less well-known scholars from the Islamic
west, the Maghrib. Ashʿarite theologians used the concept of ḥāl in a different
way from their Bahshamī opponents: in the Ashʿarite context, the aḥwāl were
rather understood as distinguishable features of beings, which can be known
although they do not exist. The adoption of the concept of aḥwāl is one of the
many historical examples for the ﬂexibility of the Ashʿarite school in integrating
speciﬁc notions from other scholarly traditions and reinterpreting them for their
own theological purposes. It is among the oddities of the history of Muslim
theology that Ashʿarite scholars relied on the concept of ḥāl to argue for the
existence of God’s entitative attributes, a hypothesis the Bahshamīs originally
sought to disprove by introducing the ḥāl into the ontology of kalām (Gimaret
1970: 79f.).
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